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This paper examines the influence of mobile network competition on the prices of
fixed-to-mobile calls. Because fixed line customers cannot, in general, distinguish the
identity of a specific mobile network, these networks have market power when setting
termination charges for calls from fixed lines. We show that: (1) unregulated mobile
termination charges will result in higher than monopoly call prices; (2) the regulation of
termination charges and prices downward will affect mobile subscription rates and may
lower these rates; and (3) regulation of any mobile carrier’s termination charges can
reduce fixed to mobile prices but will result in an increase in unregulated carriers’
termination charges. When fixed line consumers can distinguish between the different
mobile networks they are calling, fixed to mobile call prices will fall relative to their level
under customer ignorance. Direct mobile charging for termination also exerts downward
pressure on the total fixed to mobile call price. A low cost method of lowering fixed to
mobile charges would be to facilitate the identification of carriers by consumers and to
restructure billing so that mobile networks are able to directly charge fixed line
consumers for termination services. Journal of Economic Literature Classification
Numbers: L41, L96.
Keywords. Mobile network competition, termination charges, interconnect fees, price
regulation and customer ignorance.
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  ,QWURGXFWLRQ
Compared to other areas of telecommunications, mobile networks are in their
infancy and, to date, there has been relatively little analysis of mobile network
pricing. Recently, however, both UK and Australian competition authorities have
become interested in the prices that mobile networks charge to other networks – in
particular, fixed line networks that have an established customer base and coverage.
In December 1998, the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the
telecommunications regulator, OFTEL, released a report into the prices that the two
largest mobile networks, Cellnet and Vodafone, charge for termination of fixed line
calls made to their networks. They concluded that there was “currently insufficient
competitive constraint on termination charges” (p.3) and recommended that those
charges be regulated on the basis of cost. The Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) is currently arbitrating several disputes between fixed line and
mobile networks involving mobile termination charges. This follows the ‘declaration’
of GSM network terminating services by the ACCC. Declaration compels GSM
networks to negotiate interconnection arrangements with other carriers, where the
ACCC is the default arbitrator of any disputes.￿ The ACCC has also expressed
concern that competition between mobile networks may not lead to efficient fixed-to-
mobile termination charges (ACCC, 1999).
Recent research, such as Armstrong (1998), Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,
1998b) and Carter and Wright (1999), has focussed on interconnection charges
between competing telecommunications networks. But there has been little research
into the setting of termination charges between networks based on different modes of
telecommunications. With fixed-to-mobile pricing, the termination charges that are
set independently by competing mobile networks influence the prices set by a non-
competing network; the fixed line carrier. As termination charges influence the value
to a mobile network of attracting a customer, they play an important role in mobile
competition. As we show, however, this competition may adversely affect fixed-line
customers.
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￿ King and Maddock (1999) analyse the Australian declaration and arbitration access regime.2
The competitive effects of mobile termination charges are influenced by what
we call customer ignorance. By convention, in many countries (an exception is the
US for calls to mobiles) the caller pays for making a call. However, fixed-line
customers often cannot identify the specific mobile network that they are calling.
They might wish to call a certain person or class of people who have mobile phone
numbers, but they will often not be able to determine which mobile carrier is
associated with each person or number. Even if fixed line networks take differentials
in mobile network termination charges into account when setting fixed-to-mobile
prices, the inability of fixed-line customers to identify mobile networks and,
consequently, any price differentials in calls to them, means that fixed line customers
are likely to base their fixed-to-mobile calling patterns on average prices.
Alternatively, the fixed line carrier will set its price for fixed-to-mobile calls on the
basis of average termination charges.￿ These averages depend on the observed market
shares of mobile networks. As a result, an increase in one mobile network’s
termination charges raises the average price of fixed-to-mobile calls and lowers
demand for all of these calls. There is a horizontal externality imposed on the
termination revenues of other mobile networks as well as a vertical externality
imposed on the fixed line networks.￿ In this paper we find that both of these
externalities are potential sources of inefficient pricing.
Number portability exacerbates customer ignorance. Even where a prefix may
initially provide some information about the network being called, with mobile
number portability those differences will diminish over time, making mobile networks
indistinguishable to fixed-line customers.
To see the effect of customer ignorance in more detail, suppose that the
opposite is true and the A-party customer calling fixed-to-mobile both knows the
identity of the terminating carrier and the price of the call. In some circumstances, a
mobile network will retain some market power. If the A-party has to contact a specific
person then they will still make the call, although if the per minute termination charge
is high, they might truncate the call or ask the person on the mobile phone to call them
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￿ In its inquiry into mobile termination, the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission found that fixed line
consumers had little knowledge of the mobile networks they were calling or of price differentials in carrier-specific
call prices; see MMC (1998, pp.31-33).
￿ The vertical externality, which may lead to ‘double marginalisation’, has been thoroughly discussed in the
literature. For example, see Perry (1989). The novel issue focused on in this paper is the horizontal externality
created by customer ignorance.3
back. In other situations, the mobile carrier will have little market power. If the A-
party does not need to call a specific person, but rather can choose any individual
from a group of people, then they will choose the individual who is cheapest to
contact. For example, if the A-party needs to call a plumber, but has no preference
over which plumber they contact, then they will choose the plumber that is linked to
the mobile network with the lowest call charges. This, in turn, will make the plumber
indirectly face the termination costs – if they join a mobile network with high
termination charges then they will receive fewer calls and less business. A mobile
network with higher termination charges will have fewer subscribers and competition
will tend to moderate termination charges.
In contrast, suppose that the person making the fixed-to-mobile call is only
able to guess at the identity of the terminating network. In particular, suppose that the
A-party only knows the market shares of mobile carriers and can only estimate the
average termination charge. Then each mobile network does not bear the full
competitive consequences from raising their termination charges and, as a result, will
have considerable discretion to raise these charges. When one network raises its
termination charges, this raises the average price that the A-party pays. But the A-
party only knows this average and because they cannot distinguish between mobile
networks, they will make their calling decisions on the basis of the average price, not
the network specific charges. This, in turn, breaks the indirect link between
termination charges and call frequency to a specific mobile customer.
Take the plumber example presented above. If the A-party cannot distinguish
the identity of the terminating network before they make their call, then this identity is
irrelevant to the decision about which plumber to call. The person may call a plumber
on a network with high or low termination charges, but they are only likely to know
this when they receive a bill. By then, it is too late for the A-party to change their
calling decision. The plumber on a network that has high termination charges is no
longer penalised through fewer calls for these charges, and so does not even indirectly
bear these charges. In fact, to the degree that a network might pass some of these high
termination charges back to a customer through lower prices for calls originating on
the mobile network, the plumber might have an economic incentive to join a network
with high termination charges.
High mobile termination charges will adversely affect fixed-line carriers’
profits. This may increase the incentive for vertical integration. By integrating with a4
mobile network, the fixed-line network can potentially internalise the vertical
externality.
High mobile termination charges will also raise regulatory concerns. In
particular, should the authorities respond by regulating mobile termination charges or
are there structural changes or administrative rules that can moderate regulatory
concerns?
In this paper we present a model of customer ignorance and show how this
affects mobile termination and call pricing when there are multiple mobile networks
but a single fixed-line carrier. Our model is developed in two stages. First, in section
2, we consider a situation where the mobile networks are not close substitutes and
their market shares are effectively fixed. This allows us to consider the horizontal and
vertical effects of termination charging without considering their impact on subscriber
competition between mobile networks. In section 3 we then examine what happens
when two mobile networks compete against one another. We model this by assuming
that termination charges are set prior to competition for customers by mobile
networks. This extension to our model allows us to analyse the relationship between
mobile termination charges and subscriber charges.
Our basic pricing results follow directly from the horizontal and vertical
externalities noted above. Unregulated mobile termination charges will be higher than
the monopoly pricing of such services. An increase in termination charges by one
mobile network raises the average price for fixed-to-mobile calls and reduces both the
fixed carrier’s profits and, due to customer ignorance, the profits received by other
mobile carriers. As a result, each mobile network has an incentive to overprice
termination from both a social and an industry perspective. Indeed, the smaller (in
terms of network share) a mobile network, the less likely is it to internalise the
demand-reducing effects of an increase in its termination charge. So the less
concentrated the mobile network market, the higher will be the level of fixed to
mobile call charges.
The overpricing of termination is exacerbated by competition between mobile
networks for subscribers. By having a higher termination charge, a mobile network
effectively receives greater benefits from attracting an additional subscriber and,
hence, can afford to offer more attractive subscription terms to that customer. In
essence, termination revenues ‘cross subsidise’ subscriptions. In the extreme, mobile
network competition could result in termination charges that ‘choke-off’ fixed to5
mobile demand entirely. That is, in equilibrium, mobile termination charges may be
so high that the fixed carrier is unable to profitably offer fixed to mobile service.￿
The fixed carrier might try and moderate high termination charges by
integrating with one of the mobile carriers. If mobile carriers compete for the same
group of customers, then integration, together with a refusal to deal with any non-
integrated mobile network, can result in a fixed and mobile monopoly. This would
internalise the horizontal and vertical externalities but destroy any mobile
competition. Alternatively, if mobile carriers effectively supply different groups of
subscribers, then integration is of little benefit. Integration between the fixed carrier
and one mobile carrier will reduce the average effective termination charge, as the
integrated firm sets its implicit termination charge equal to marginal cost. But other
non-integrated carriers will respond by raising their termination charges. We show
that, as a result, the integrated carrier receives lower profits than if it was vertically
separated and integration is not advantageous to the relevant networks.
Regulation might be used to moderate the competitive concerns about mobile
termination charges. There are a variety of alternatives.￿ For example, termination
charges could be directly regulated. This is likely to result in lower termination
charges, lower fixed-to-mobile prices and a greater intensity of fixed-to-mobile calls.
But reducing termination charges will also affect the price of other mobile services,
such as mobile subscriber charges. Naively, we might expect lower termination
charges to result in less subscriber competition and higher subscriber charges. We
show however that this is incorrect in the context of our model. Lower regulated
termination fees can lead to higher termination revenues for the mobile carriers. These
revenues then generate greater competition for mobile subscribers and lower charges
to join a mobile network. Regulation can benefit both the fixed-line and the mobile
customers.
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￿ Note that overpricing of termination will occur even if mobile subscribers prefer more incoming calls as well as
outgoing calls. So long as consumers on the fixed network cannot distinguish between alternative mobile networks
when making calls, their demand will be based on an average price. If one mobile network reduces its termination
charges then it may reduce the average price of fixed-to-mobile calls and increase the total number and duration of
these calls, but it will not increase the relative number of calls its subscribers receive. As such, mobile networks
have little ability to use differences in termination charges to attract consumers to their network. While a consumer
preference for incoming calls may increase the attractiveness of subscribing to some mobile phone network, so
long as there is customer ignorance, this will not exert significant competitive pressure on termination charges.
￿ One option that we have not addressed is to provide mobile consumers with a ‘receiver pays’ option for fixed to
mobile calls, as is practiced in the United States. Recent research suggests that this may have a beneficial effect on
fixed to mobile prices and mobile competition. See Doyle and Smith (1998).6
Rather than regulate all termination charges, authorities might only regulate
termination for those mobile carriers with the greatest market share. However, as
noted above for integration, selective reduction in some carriers’ termination charges
will result in an increase in other carriers’ termination charges.￿
We also consider other, more structural, regulatory procedures. For example,
authorities may try to reduce customer ignorance by requiring mobile carriers to
‘identify’ themselves before call charging commences. We find that if consumers can
distinguish between networks then termination charges are reduced, although they
may still result in fixed-to-mobile call prices above monopoly levels due to double
marginalisation.
One source of market power for mobile carriers is that termination charges are
likely to be more difficult to change than the actual price of fixed-to-mobile calls and
are embedded in these call prices. For example, changing termination charges may
involve considerable inter-carrier negotiation whereas an unregulated fixed carrier
will often be able to alter the price of fixed-to-mobile calls as it desires. This relative
inflexibility allows the mobile carriers to act as price leaders in the setting of fixed-to-
mobile charges. A regulatory authority might improve competition by separating
termination charges. This could be done, say, by separating a fixed line bill into two
components – a terminating charge and a trunk-originating charge. In return for a
regulated billing fee, the fixed line carrier would still do the actual billing and the
caller would still pay for the calls. We show that this simple regulatory option would
moderate the vertical externality between mobile and fixed carriers, resulting in lower
fixed-to-mobile call prices.￿
Overall, our analysis shows that mobile termination charges are unlikely to
reflect termination costs and will tend to increase, rather than decrease, with mobile
network competition. Regulation can moderate this problem, but authorities need to
be aware that changes to termination charges may also effect mobile subscriber fees.
Some arms-length regulatory procedures, such as carrier identification and direct
mobile charging, can be used to reduce termination charges. However, reduction of
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￿  Gans and King (1999) consider the regulation of termination charges for ‘non-dominant’ mobile networks in
detail.
￿  Australia is currently pursuing the option of allowing fixed-line customers to pre-select the firm that will bill
them for fixed-to-mobile calls. The pre-selected firm will negotiate directly with the fixed and mobile carriers
regarding the origination, trunk and termination charges for fixed-to-mobile calls. If there is strong competition7
mobile termination charges to reflect termination costs is likely to require direct price
intervention.
  ([RJHQRXV0RELOH1HWZRUN0DUNHW6KDUHV
We begin by analysing fixed to mobile call charges when mobile networks’
market shares are exogenous. This simplifies the strategic interactions between
networks and allows us to focus on the key determinants of termination charges. The
exogenous market share case is most applicable to situations where mobile networks
are not strong substitutes, for example if different networks cover different regions or
consumer groups. This case abstracts from the effect of termination charges on
competition between networks for subscribers. Consequently, in section 3, we extend
the model to allow for mobile network competition and explore the interactions
between fixed to mobile prices and other prices that may be set by fixed and mobile
carriers. We will see that the logic of many of the results presented in this section
continues to be valid even in this more complex framework.￿
  0RGHO6HW8SDQG$VVXPSWLRQV
Consider a model with n independent mobile networks and a single fixed
network. Mobile phone customers are exogenously distributed between mobile
networks where si is the market share of mobile network i. The marginal cost of
terminating a call on a mobile network is given by 
M
T c  while the marginal cost of
originating a call on the fixed network is 
F
O c . The marginal cost of trunk services is
given by  1 c  so that the total marginal cost of a fixed-to-mobile call is given by
1
FM
FM O T cc c c =+ +.
Let  i P be the price of a call from the fixed network to mobile network i. We
can think of this price as either being a price per call or a price per minute of the call.
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between pre-selected firms then the negotiated charges will be passed on directly to the customer and pre-selection
will be identical to the direct charging option discussed here.
￿  We could view the fixed share case as modelling a situation where mobile networks cannot commit to
termination charges prior to signing-up subscribers. The analysis here would then reflect the interaction in the8
The fixed carrier sets this price. We assume that either (1) the fixed carrier is unable
to set a different price for different mobile networks, so that  P P P j i = =  for all
mobile carriers or (2) that the customers cannot determine which mobile carrier they
are ringing ex ante. Under this later assumption, the fixed carrier could set different
prices for different mobile carriers but these prices would only influence consumers’
decisions to the extent that they change the average price, P that customers pay. This
average price determines demand and is given by  i i iP s P å = . The second
assumption captures the idea of customer ignorance discussed above.
As consumers either explicitly or effectively face a single (average) fixed-to-
mobile price, P, the demand for fixed-to-mobile calls is given by Q(P). It is often
convenient to assume that this demand is linear so that  1
2 () b Qa P =- . The linear
demand assumption allows us to explicitly calculate prices and charges and to
compare these charges over different regimes. The fixed carrier will set the price of
fixed-to-mobile calls taking into account both the demand for such calls and the cost
of those calls.
If the fixed and mobile networks are owned by separate firms, then the
marginal termination cost that will enter the fixed carrier’s pricing policy is not the
true marginal cost of termination, 
M
T c  but rather the marginal termination charge set
by the relevant mobile carrier. We denote the marginal termination charge set by
mobile carrier i by  i T  per call.
A useful benchmark price for our analysis is the uniform monopoly price for
fixed-to-mobile calls. This is the profit maximising price that would be set by a single
firm that owned both the fixed network and the only mobile network. We denote this
price by 
m P , where it is implicitly defined for a general demand function by
() () () 0
mm
FM QP P c Q P ¢ -+ = . For the case of a linear demand,  1
2 ()
m
FM Pa c =+  and
the associated monopoly quantity is  1
4 ()
m
FM b Qa c =-. Monopoly profits from the




FM b ac P= -
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subgame after mobile subscribers have chosen their network. In contrast, section 3 allows for ex ante commitment
by mobile networks to termination charges.9
  8QUHJXODWHG2XWFRPHV:LWKRXW,QWHJUDWLRQ
Suppose that the n mobile networks independently and simultaneously set
their linear termination charges  i T . The fixed network owner then sets the fixed-to-
mobile price P. Given this (average) price, customers decide how many fixed-to-
mobile calls they will make, taking into account their own ignorance of the identity of
the terminating mobile carrier for any specific call. With each decision, the relevant
firm seeks to maximise its profits and all networks take the market shares of each
mobile carrier as given. Given the termination charges, the fixed carrier will set P to
solve:












ii O i Pa s T c c =+ + + å  and  1
1 4 ()
F
ii O b i Qas T c c =- - - å . Given the behaviour of
the fixed carrier, the mobile networks will simultaneously set their termination
charges to solve:




Ti T j j O j
s
Tc a s Tc c
b
-- - - å
The first order condition for the mobile carrier’s optimisation problem is given by:
1 20
FM
jj i i O i T ji as T s T c c s c
¹ -- - - + = å
Solving these first order conditions simultaneously for all mobile carriers gives the
Nash equilibrium termination charges.
There are three cases worth more detailed consideration. First, suppose that
there is just one mobile carrier. This allows us to isolate the effects of vertical
separation. In this situation,  1 = i s , so that  1
1 2 ()
FM




FM Pa cP =+>  so long as  FM ac > . The total quantity of fixed to mobile calls is
given by  1
8 () FM b Qa c =-. This is the standard double marginalisation result – vertical
separation of the fixed and mobile carriers leads to pricing above the monopoly level.
This is detrimental for both consumers and for the firms themselves. The monopoly
price maximises industry profits so that a higher price under vertical separation leads
to lower industry profits than an integrated monopoly. Here, the mobile carrier’s10
profits are 
2 1
16 () FM b ac -  while the fixed carrier’s profits are 
2 1
32 () FM b ac - . Total
profit equals  ()
2 3
32 FM b ac - , less than the profit for an integrated monopoly given
above.
Second, suppose that there are only two mobile networks. Solving the first
order conditions for these two networks gives the termination charges as
1
1 3 (( 2 ) )
i
FM
iO i j T s Ta c c s s c =- - + -  for each of the two mobile carriers i. The (average)
price of fixed to mobile calls is given by  1
6 (5 )
m
FM Pa cP =+>  with associated
quantity  1
12 () FM b Qa c =- . Note that in this situation that the price of fixed to mobile
calls is higher than when there is a single mobile carrier. This is due to the effect of
horizontal separation. Each network has an incentive to unilaterally raise its
termination charge relative to the case of a single carrier as it gains the full price
benefit of such a rise but shares any related loss in sales. This effect tends to be larger
for small networks. Note that as the market share of any mobile carrier decreases, its















At the same time, the share of the other carrier must increase and its termination
charge falls. In the linear demand case considered here, the changes in termination
charges that result from changes in mobile carrier market shares exactly offset each
other. In other words, for the case of two mobile carriers, the price of fixed to mobile
calls is independent of the shares of the individual mobile carriers even though the
specific termination charges do depend on these shares.
The third case of interest allows for competition between an arbitrary number
of symmetric mobile carriers. From the first order conditions, with nmobile carriers,
each of whom has a market share of  n 1 , each carrier will independently set its




iO T nn Ta c c c + =- - +. The price of fixed to
mobile calls is  ()
1








+ =+ > .11
For fixed to mobile calls there is not really any competition between mobile carriers.
Because the person making the call is ignorant of the specific carrier they are calling,
mobile carriers have no incentive to compete by offering a lower termination price.
But as the number of carriers increases, the effect of horizontal separation rises and
this pushes up the termination charges and the fixed to mobile price.
  5HJXODWLRQ
There is clearly a range of regulatory rules that could be introduced by the
authorities. We begin by considering two arms-length procedures then consider direct
price regulation.
  'LUHFWPRELOHFKDUJLQJ
As discussed in section 1, a minimal regulatory rule could involve the mobile
carriers directly charging the A-party for call termination. The fixed carrier would
only charge a customer the origination and trunk fee for a fixed-to-mobile call while
the mobile carrier would charge the customer the termination charge. To make such a
rule feasible, the actual billing would have to be done by the fixed carrier, possibly in
return for a regulated billing fee.
Direct mobile charging does not alter customer ignorance. Customers still do
not know which mobile network is associated with a specific number until after they
have been billed. But it does alter the strategic interaction between the fixed and the
mobile carriers.
To see the effects of direct mobile charging, suppose that the fixed network
sets a price for origination and trunk carriage of O. The total price for a call from the
fixed network to the mobile carrier  i i T O P + = . Under customer ignorance, with the
shares of each mobile company given by  i s , the expected price that the customer pays
for a fixed to mobile call is  å + =
i i iT s O P . The fixed carrier and mobile carriers
simultaneously set their charges so that the fixed carrier solves:
1
1 2 max ( )( )
F
Oi i O b i aO s TOc c -- - - å .
The first order condition for the fixed carrier is given by  1 20
F
ii O i aO s T cc -- + + = å .
Each mobile carrier will solve:12




Tj j i T j
s
aO s TT c
b
-- - å .
The first order condition for each mobile carrier is  20
M
ii j j iT ji aO s T s T s c
¹ -- - + = å .
Again, it is worth looking at three cases – a single mobile carrier, two mobile carriers
with asymmetric market shares and nsymmetric mobile carriers.
First, if there is a single mobile carrier, solving the first order conditions gives
1
1 3(2 2 )
MF
TO Oa ccc =- ++and  1
1 3(2 )
FM
OT Ta c c c =- - + . The total price of a fixed to
mobile call is given by  1
3(2 ) FM Pa c =+. This price is below the standard double
marginalisation price, as direct mobile charging has reduced the effect of vertical
separation. At the same time, direct mobile charging introduces a new element of
horizontal separation. The fixed and mobile components of the call are now
complementary inputs from the consumers’ perspective, but are provided by different
firms. Thus, mobile direct charging does not completely internalise adverse spillovers
in firm pricing and still leads to a price above the integrated monopoly price.
Second, suppose that there are two mobile carriers with potentially different
market shares. In this situation,
1
1 4 (3 3 )
FM
OT Oa cc c =++ - and  ()
1
1 4 (3 ) ( )
i
MF
iT i j O s Ta c s s c c =+ - - + .
The expected total price is  1
4 (3 ) FM Pa c =+. As with the unregulated case, the total
price of a fixed to mobile call is independent of the actual shares of the mobile
carriers with linear demand. But the price is lower with direct mobile charging than
with standard vertical separation. The specific termination charges set by each carrier
will depend on their market shares and, as in the case without regulation, these
termination charges tend to rise for a carrier as its market share falls.
Third, consider nsymmetric mobile carriers. Solving the first order conditions
in this situation gives a total price of  ()
1
2 (1 ) FM n Pn a c + =+ + . To see the effect of
increasing the number of mobile carriers with direct charging,
2 0
(2 )






The price of fixed to mobile calls rises as the number of mobile carriers increases
even with direct charging.
Overall, direct mobile charging, even in the presence of customer ignorance,
tends to result in lower fixed to mobile prices than no regulation. But at the same13
time, it still leads to prices above the integrated monopoly level, and the price tends to
rise as the number of mobile carriers increases.
  &DUULHULGHQWLILFDWLRQ
An alternative regulatory approach would involve carrier identification. At a
minimum, this would involve advertising which carriers were associated with which
numbers to reduce customer ignorance. Even so, this would only be a short-term
solution and would not be amenable to mobile number portability. Carrier
identification could involve a customer being informed of the identity of the mobile
carrier that they are calling after they dial the number but before billing commenced.
A simple sound may suffice.￿ The customer would then have the option of terminating
the call if they did not want to buy the relevant call.
If carrier identification perfectly removes customer ignorance then each
mobile carrier is independent and there is no horizontal spillover between carriers. If
there is no call substitution then the fixed carrier and each mobile carrier are, in effect,
a separate vertical pair. In other words, if a customer wishes to call a person or
company connected to a specific mobile carrier and there is no alternative to this call,
then the fixed and relevant mobile carriers are just like sequential monopolists. As a
result, the behaviour of the fixed carrier and each mobile carrier will be identical to




OT Ta c c c =- - +,  1
4 (3 )
m
FM Pa cP =+>  and  8 ()
i s
FM b Qa c =-. Carrier
identification completely removes the effect of horizontal separation but it has no
effect on vertical separation.
Alternatively, if there is call substitution between carriers, then each mobile
carrier will have a reduced ability to exert any monopoly power. We would expect
mobile termination charges to fall and this to be reflected in the fixed-to-mobile price.
In the extreme, suppose that there is perfect substitution between calls to different
mobile carriers. In this case, a customer has numerous firms or people that they could
call, and these firms or people are connected to different networks. The customer does
not care which firm or person they call and will simply choose the firm or person
associated with the cheapest fixed-to-mobile price. This leads to perfect competition
between the mobile carriers, and termination charges will be set at marginal cost. The14
fixed carrier, however, retains all of their monopoly power and can set the price of
fixed-to-mobile calls equal to the monopoly price.
  &DUULHULGHQWLILFDWLRQDQGGLUHFWPRELOHFKDUJLQJ
It might seem sensible to use direct mobile charging to reduce the effect of
vertical separation and carrier identification to remove the effect of horizontal
separation. First consider the case with no call substitution between mobile networks.
If these regulatory options are both implemented, then the result for the fixed network
and each individual carrier will be like the situation of direct mobile charging with
only one mobile carrier. In other words, for each mobile carrier,
1
1 3(2 2 )
MF
TO Oa ccc =- ++and  1
1 3(2 )
FM
OT Ta c c c =- - + . The total price of a fixed to
mobile call is given by  1
3(2 ) FM Pa c =+. Again it is worth pointing out that this price
is below the price established with just carrier identification, but remains above the
integrated monopoly price.
As substitution between mobile carriers increases, termination charges under
direct mobile charging will decrease until, with perfect substitution, the charges equal
marginal cost. The fixed carrier retains its monopoly power so that the origination
charge will be set at the monopoly level, 
mM
T OP c =-.
  'LUHFWVHWWLQJRIWHUPLQDWLRQFKDUJHV
In contrast to the arms-length options considered above, the regulator could set
termination charges directly. Suppose the regulator establishes a termination charge t
that must be set by all mobile carriers. The fixed carrier will then take this regulated
charge as given and set the price of fixed to mobile calls to maximise profits. As the
termination charges are now simply a cost to the fixed carrier, and all strategic








T PP c t -=- . If the regulator sets the marginal termination charge equal to the
marginal cost of termination, then the price will equal the integrated monopoly price.
If the regulator sets a termination charge above marginal cost then the fixed-to-mobile

￿ ‘AT&T’ have a simple identification sound in the US.15
price rises, while if the regulator sets a termination charge below the marginal
termination cost, then the fixed-to-mobile price falls below the monopoly price.
The socially optimal price for fixed-to-mobile calls is given by the marginal




OT cc ca t =+ + -  before profit maximisation by the fixed carrier was aligned
with the social optimum.￿￿
For any higher termination charge, 
* t t > , social welfare will be decreasing as
the termination charge rises. In particular, note that it is not optimal for the regulator
to set the termination charge equal to the marginal cost of termination. This only leads
to integrated monopoly pricing and monopoly profits for the fixed carrier. Rather, to
raise social welfare the regulator needs to set the termination charge below marginal
cost.￿￿ This creates a problem for the regulator. The mobile carriers will make a loss
on terminating calls. This loss will need to be recouped from some other source. For
example, if the regulator sets the termination charge below cost, but that is all, then
the mobile carriers would have to recoup their loses from terminating calls by raising
charges on outgoing calls. If competition prevented this, then some carriers would
need to leave the industry to reduce competition and allow outgoing call prices to rise.
In brief, setting the termination charges below cost to correct the distortion in fixed to
mobile calls will lead to a reduction in mobile subscriber competition.
One alternative for the regulator is to set termination charges at zero. Such
termination charges will help offset the monopoly pricing by the fixed carrier. If a is
large relative to  FM c , then a zero termination charge can still exceed 
* t . But if a is
relatively close to  FM c  or 
M
T c  is relatively large, then zero termination charges may be
below the socially optimal level.
Zero termination charges have the advantage that they are easy to implement.
The regulator simply does not allow mobile carriers to charge for termination. As the
fixed carrier bills the customer, this carrier can enforce the rule by simply not passing
any fees onto the mobile carriers. At the same time, zero termination fees will result
in the mobile carriers making a loss from terminating fixed-to-mobile calls. To avoid

￿￿  In practice the regulator will face standard information constraints when setting t . For example, the regulator
may not know 
M
T c . Baron and Myerson (1982) and Baron (1989) discuss this issue.16
these losses from impacting on other aspects of mobile phone competition, the mobile
carriers will need to be compensated for this loss, say by a fixed per carrier transfer
from the owner of the fixed network.
  ,QWHUYHQWLRQIRURQO\DGRPLQDQWFDUULHU
An alternative to direct price setting for all mobile carrier termination charges
would be to just set the termination charge for a ‘dominant’ carrier. To see the effect
of such a policy, suppose that there are n mobile carriers, and they have asymmetric
market shares. Let  i j s s >  for all firms  j i ¹ so that firm j is the ‘dominant’ carrier.
The regulator directly sets firm j’s termination charge for fixed-to-mobile calls at t .
All other carriers then simultaneously set their termination charges. Given these
termination charges, the fixed carrier sets the price for fixed-to-mobile calls.
Using the first order conditions presented in section 2.2 above, replacing  j T
with t , we see that mobile carrier i will set its termination charge so that
1 , 20
FM
kk j ii O iT kij as T s s T c c s c t
¹ -- - - - + = å .
To simplify, assume that all non-dominant (and non-regulated) mobile carriers are
symmetric with market shares  1




















1 2 (2 1) (1 )
FM
Oj j T n Pn a c c ss c t =- + + - + -
Note that 
m P P > even if 
M
T c t =  so long as  2 ³ n . In other words, even if the
regulator requires the dominant carrier to set its termination price at marginal cost, the
resultant fixed-to-mobile price will always exceed the integrated monopoly price
whenever there is at least one other mobile carrier.
This said, regulation of one mobile carrier leads to lower fixed-to-mobile
prices than no regulation so long as the regulated price does not exceed the marginal

￿￿  Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1996) discuss this issue for general access pricing with imperfect downstream17
termination cost by too much. To see this, let  P D  denote the difference between the
fixed-to-mobile price with one mobile carrier regulated and the price with no
regulation but the same total number of mobile carriers. Then
()
1
1 2( 1 ) (1 ) ( )
FM M
OT j T nn Pa c c c n s c t + D= -+ + + + + - . This will be negative so long as
M
T c t -  is not too positive.
The effect of dominant carrier regulation in reducing the equilibrium fixed to
mobile price is small compared to the effect of additional mobile carriers in raising
this price. To see this, suppose that one carrier is regulated but at the same time there
is one more mobile carrier. In other words, while the dominant carrier is regulated,
another unregulated mobile carrier enters the industry. Holding the market share of
the dominant carrier fixed, let the change in price under regulation with an extra
mobile firm compared to the case of no regulation with one less mobile firm be




jT n Ps c t + D= - . This is positive if 
M
T c t -  is positive.
  5HJXODWLRQE\VHWWLQJWKHIL[HGWRPRELOHSULFH
One final regulatory option should be noted. While the above analysis has
considered the regulation of the termination charges set by the mobile carriers, an
alternative solution to the problem of fixed-to-mobile charges might be the direct
regulatory setting of the fixed-to-mobile call price. Setting the end price for fixed-to-
mobile calls avoids some of the problems with regulating mobile termination charges
directly. In particular, it avoids issues of regulating firms that only have a relatively
small market share. Once the final price is established, termination charges would
then simply be a device used by the carriers to divide any profit that exists under the
regulation. While the setting of these charges could lead to considerable dispute, such
a dispute is more about sharing profits than about raising prices to the detriment of
final customers.
  ,QWHJUDWLRQ
In the discussion above, we assumed that each mobile carrier and the fixed
carrier were independent. What if the fixed carrier also owns one of the mobile

competition.18
carriers? For simplicity, we refer to this as the case of integration. In this situation, the
mobile carrier that is owned by the fixed carrier cannot effectively raise its marginal
termination charge above marginal cost. Any such increase would merely transfer
funds from the fixed carrier to the mobile carrier. But as the same company owns
these carriers, the transfers would simply be internal to the company. A manager or
owner who sought to maximise the total profits of the company would disregard such
internal transfers as they have no effect on the profit of the company as a whole.
With integration, the fixed carrier will take the price of terminating calls to
mobile phone networks other than its own as given, and will set the price of fixed-to-
mobile calls to maximise company profits. Let  F s  refer to the fraction of mobile
phone customers who are subscribers to the mobile carrier that is owned by the fixed
carrier. The integrated carrier will solve:
1 max ( ) ( )
FM
PO F T i i iF Pc c s c s T Q P
¹ -- - - å
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FT ii O b iF Qa s c s T c c
¹ =-- - - å . Given the behaviour of the fixed carrier, the
non-integrated mobile networks will simultaneously set their termination charges to
solve:
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b
¹ --- - - å .
The first order condition for the mobile carriers optimisation is given by
1 , 20
MF M
FT j j ii O iT ji F as c s T s Tc c s c
¹ -- - - - += å .
Solving these first order conditions simultaneously for all mobile carriers gives the
Nash equilibrium termination charges.
The first order conditions for the fixed and non-integrated mobile carriers are
mathematically identical to the case of no integration but direct regulation of a
dominant mobile carrier with 
M
T c t = . Consequently, the results with integration will
be directly analogous to this situation. For example, if there are n mobile carriers in
total and each non-integrated carrier has an equal market share, then the termination
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Given these termination charges the fixed-to-mobile price is given by:
()
1
1 2 (2 1) (2 1)
FM
OF T n Pn a c c s c =- + + - -




iO T Ta c c c =- - +,  1
4 (3 )
m
FM Pa cP =+>  and  1
8 () FM b Qa c =-.
From  P D  above with
M
T c t = , integration together with entry by one extra non-
integrated mobile carrier leads to no change in the price of fixed-to-mobile calls. In
this sense, integration of one mobile carrier with the fixed carrier is equivalent to
‘losing’ one mobile carrier in terms of the effect on price. For example, if there are
only two carriers, one of which is integrated with the fixed carrier, then the price of
fixed-to-mobile calls in equilibrium is the same as the ‘double marginalisation’ price
with only one non-integrated carrier. In this case the non-integrated mobile carrier’s
profits are equal to 
2 1
16 () FM b ac - , the same as if it were the only mobile carrier. The
integrated carrier makes profits 
2 1
32 () FM b ac - . These are the same as if it did not own
a mobile carrier and there was only one non-integrated mobile carrier.
In this example, integration raises total industry profit but also ‘diverts’ profits
to the non-integrated mobile carrier. This suggests that the fixed carrier might have no
incentive to integrate. Or, if it is initially integrated, then the fixed carrier might have
incentive to separate from its mobile carrier, particularly in the longer term when
market shares of mobile carriers have ‘settled down.’ To confirm this, if there are n
symmetric non-integrated mobile carriers then the fixed carrier makes profit of
2
2 1
8( 1 )() FF M bn ac
+ P= -  while each mobile carrier makes profit of
2
2 1
4( 1 )() MF M bn ac
+ P= - . In contrast, if the fixed carrier is integrated with one of the n
mobile carriers, then the integrated carrier makes total profits  2
2 1
8 () IF M bn ac P= - .
Integration will only be profitable if  IFM P³ P+ P. Simplifying, it is only profitable
to be an integrated carrier if  22
22 3 1
88 ( 1 ) () () FM FM bn b n ac ac
+ -³ - or 
2 22 1 0 nn -- £ .
Solving this quadratic equation means that there is only an incentive to integrate if
1.37 n £ .20
To interpret this result, if all mobile carriers are symmetric, then integration
will only be a stable long-run outcome if there is only one mobile carrier. The logic
behind this is clear. Integration with one mobile carrier avoids double marginalisation
and raises total profits. But for two or more mobile carriers, it is better not to
integrate. In this case, the non-integrated mobile carriers seize all the benefits of
integration, and integration actually makes the fixed carrier worse off.
There are two clear caveats to this result. First, if integration with the fixed
carrier makes it easier to gain mobile customers and increase market share then
integration is more likely to be desirable. This could occur through reputation or
marketing. Secondly, if market shares are not symmetric then integration with the
largest of the mobile carriers may be desirable even though there are two or more
mobile carriers. This effect will tend to decrease as the number of mobile carriers
rises and market shares become more equal over time.
  0RELOH1HWZRUN&RPSHWLWLRQ
The model presented in section 2 assumed that the market share of each
mobile network was fixed and did not change as termination charges and fixed to
mobile prices changed. In many situations, however, mobile networks compete with
one another for subscribers. The costs and quality of their service critically influence
this competition and to the extent that these are influenced by termination charges
they are of relevance to this paper.
In this section we develop a model of mobile network competition in order to
understand the determinants of the market shares of competing networks. Following
Armstrong (1998) and Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a), we envisage negotiations or
regulation of termination charges as occurring prior to the competition between
mobile networks for customers. Consequently, we will take those charges as given as
the model is developed. We will then consider how termination charges interact with
mobile network competition.
For simplicity we concentrate on the case of two mobile networks, A and B,
and a single fixed line network, F. The fixed network has a set of customers of
measure a  while the mobile networks compete for a customer set of measure 1. The
value of a  can be interpreted as a measure of the relative size of the fixed customer21
base to the mobile base. We assume that these overall shares are fixed: in effect, fixed
and mobile customers are distinct and the two forms of telecommunication are not
competitors.￿￿




T c  is the marginal cost of termination on the fixed network
· 
M
O c  is the marginal cost of origination on either mobile network
·  1 c  is the marginal trunk cost incurred by fixed and mobile networks for calls
to each other
·  f is the cost of connecting a consumer to a mobile network
Thus, mobile and fixed networks can potentially have different cost structures.
The two mobile networks, A and B, sell differentiated but substitutable
products. We model this by assuming that each network is located at either end of a
line of length 1 with A located at 0 and B located at 1. Consumers are located
uniformly over the line. Given income y, outgoing calls q and incoming calls z, a
consumer located at x and joining network i has utility:
0 (,) i yv t xx u q z +- -+
where  0 v  represents a consumer’s intrinsic value of having a mobile phone and
i tx x -  denotes the cost of joining a network with ‘address’ xi (i = A, B) that differs
from the consumer’s own location.￿￿  (,) uqz captures the consumer’s utility from
making and receiving calls. To simplify the analysis we initially assume that the
consumer is indifferent to incoming calls so that  (,) () uqz uq = . Consequently, the
price of fixed-to-mobile calls will not directly concern the mobile subscriber,
although, as we show below, these prices have significant indirect effects through
subscriber competition. We comment on the implications of consumer preferences for
incoming calls later in this section.

￿￿ We will consider the implications of relaxing this assumption towards the end of this section.
￿￿ This is essentially the model structure of Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a, 1998b).22
  3ULFLQJDQGWKH'HWHUPLQDWLRQRI0DUNHW6KDUHV
We can now consider a consumer’s choice between mobile carriers. Let v(p)
be the indirect utility function of a consumer who faces an outgoing call price of p
(per call or call-minute) (i.e.,  () m a x () q vp uq p q º- ). We interpret this, as do
Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b), as the utility generated from calling a particular
person. Implicitly, this means that consumers do not refrain from calling people when
the price of doing so rises but merely that they call them for less often or for smaller
periods of time.
We will assume that mobile consumers can be offered non-linear prices, i.e., a
two-part tariff. That is,
(, , ) i i ij iF i i i ij ij iF iF Wqq q F p q p q pq =+ + +
where:
·  Fi is the fixed fee or subscriber charge;
·  pi is the per call intra-network charge on network i;
·  qi is the quantity of calls on network i;
·  pij is the per call charge from network i to network j
·  qij is the quantity of calls from network i to network j
·  piF is the per call charge from network i to network F
·  qiF is the quantity of calls from network i to network F
)XUWKHUOHWTij be the termination charge from network i to network j and TiF  be the
termination charge for the fixed network. pFi, TFi and qFi are defined analogously.
Consider an ‘average’ consumer whose (expected) callng pattern matches the
distribution of customers over the fixed and mobile networks. Then the call utility for
that consumer from subscribing to either network A or B is:
()
1
11 () ( 1) ( ) ( ) A A AB AF A Vs v ps v p v p F
a
aa ++ =+ - + -
()
1
11 () ( 1 ) ( ) () BB A B B F B Vs v p s v p v p F
a
aa ++ =+ - + -23
where s is the market share (among mobile consumers) of network A.￿￿
The market share of network A, s, is determined by the point of indifference











where  1/(2 ) t s =  is the degree of substitutability between the two mobile networks.
Note that in bidding for customers, each network will find it optimal to set
each call charge equal to its marginal cost. Focusing on network A, these usage prices
are:  1
MM
AO T pc cc =+ + ,  1
M
AB O BA pc c T =+ + , and  1
M
AF O FA pc c T =+ + . This is a common
outcome when firms can set multi-part tariffs. It is in a network’s interest to set non-
distortionary tariffs, because when price is set equal to marginal cost, the sum of
consumer surplus and that network’s per customer profits is maximised. If this were
the only component of pricing, the network may not recover any fixed costs, e.g.,
customer connection costs. However, the fixed charge, FA, can be utilised to divide
total value created (that is, utility less costs).￿￿
Because our focus is on fixed-to-mobile prices we will fix the other
termination charges at their respective marginal termination costs. That is,
M
AB BA T TTc == and 
F
FA FB T TTc == . These are the outcomes that would result from
efficient bargaining between those carriers (Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a).
Given these simplifying assumptions, the market share of network A becomes:
()
1
2 BA sF F s =+ - (5.1)
Note that an interior equilibrium exists if s (the degree of mobile network
substitution) is not too high.
  (TXLOLEULXP0RELOH&KDUJHV
We can now consider the mobile networks’ choice of subscription charge, FA
and FB, given the fixed-to-mobile termination charges  AF T  and  BF T . Each network
will choose their charge to maximise its profits taking the other network’s prices as

￿￿  Effectively, this is an expected utility calculation reflecting the utility of calling a specific person whose
probability of belonging to a network is given by that network’s market share.
￿￿ For a discussion of this see King and Maddock (1996).24
given. In a Nash equilibrium (if it exists), each network will be satisfied with their
choices and find unilateral deviations unprofitable.
Given our assumptions network A’s profit is,
1 ()( )
M
AA A F T sF f sT c Q
a
a p + =- + - .
where  FA qQ =  under customer ignorance. This profit is the sum of the mobile
network’s profits from its own customers and the profit from terminating calls from
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(5.2)
Raising its charge increases the direct revenues A earns from its inframarginal
customers. However, it also drives away marginal customers. This is costly because
not only does A lose its direct revenues but also the termination revenues it would
otherwise receive from customers on the fixed network calling those marginal
customers.  B faces the same trade-off when determining its subscription charge.
It is important to note that the existence of fixed-to-mobile termination profits
makes networks tougher price competitors for subscribers. When networks discount
to gain a customer, they also attract the calls from the fixed network to that customer.
This makes the marginal customer more valuable and hence, bidding for that
customer more intense. To see this, note that given  AF T  and  BF T , per subscriber
termination profits are  ()
1
M















The fixed line network also chooses its prices following the setting of
termination charges. With linear demand, its first order condition is as before:
()
11
1 22 () ( 1 ) 0
F
OA F B F bb aP c c s T s T -+++ + - = (5.3)
Simultaneously solving the three first order conditions, we find that:
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(5.4)25
So long as s is low enough (i.e., mobile networks are relatively poor substitutes), then
this is the unique (Nash) equilibrium. Perhaps more instructive is the equilibrium
market share for network A:
() ()
1
2 31 AF BF sT T Q
sa
a + =+ - (5.5)
Notice that when  AF BF TT = , s is equal to ½. When  AF BF TT >  results in  1
2 s >  as this
raises the relative revenue A earns from its customers and hence, increases the
attractiveness of competing for those customers.
  )L[HGWR0RELOH3ULFHV
As for the case of fixed market shares, the analysis of fixed-to-mobile prices
and mobile network termination charges depends critically upon how informed
consumers are regarding the network they are calling. If they cannot distinguish
between alternative networks they will base their demand on a weighted price and the
outcome will be as if the fixed network charged the same price for calls to each
mobile network. On the other hand, if they can make such distinctions, price
discrimination is possible.
We continue to assume consumer ignorance. This means that  FA qs Q =  and
(1 ) FB qs Q =- . Recall from the fixed market share case that the price of fixed to
mobile calls, P, is a monopoly price,  1
1 2 (( 1 ) )
FF
AF BF O Pa s T s T c c =+ + - + +. Given the
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The profit equation for network A (taking into account the interior equilibrium in
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(5.6)
A chooses TAF to maximise these profits. The first order condition is:








Essentially, the mobile networks act as relative profit maximisers on their termination
charges. The intuition here is that own profit is passed on to mobile subscribers
through price competition unless termination profits exceeds that of the other mobile
network. If it does, then the difference can be appropriated. Consequently, mobile
networks can maximise total profit by ensuring that their termination profits are high
relative to the other network.
Consider a symmetric equilibrium where  AF BF TT = . It is easy to see that in
that equilibrium Q = 0 or  1
FF
AF BF O TTa c c == - - . That is, mobile termination charges
are set so high that demand for fixed to mobile calls reaches its ‘choke point’ as
defined by P = a. The intuition here is simple. Suppose Pa =  and  0 Q = . Network A
could improve its own termination profits by setting its termination charge below
1
FF
O ac c --. However, this will confer a greater increment to termination profits of the
rival network. This is because that network enjoys the benefit of a positive number of
fixed to mobile calls but a greater mark-up for those units. Consequently, while
termination profit may increase, relative termination profits and hence, overall profits
falls.
  3UHIHUHQFHVIRU,QFRPLQJ&DOOV
The analysis above shows that when mobile termination charges are set
independently, they tend to be above marginal cost, and in the case of termination
charges for fixed calls, they may be set so high as to ‘choke’ off fixed to mobile
demand. One assumption in our model was that mobile consumers do not care about
the quantity and hence, price of incoming calls from other networks. It is easy to see,
however, that given our assumption of customer ignorance, consumer preferences for
incoming calls do not alter our results.
Suppose that mobile consumers cared about the quantity of calls they received
from the fixed line network.￿￿ When evaluating which network to choose they will
look at more than simply the subscription charge they face. They will also consider
the fixed to mobile price charged to consumers and the quantity of calls received by
the network. However, under customer ignorance, fixed to mobile prices do not

￿￿ Also, suppose the consumers were not ‘large’ in the sense that they commanded monopsony power.27
effectively differ among networks. Therefore, regardless of which network they join,
the quantity of incoming calls will be the same. It is only when fixed-line customers
are aware of the network that they are calling and the price of that network that
consumer preferences for incoming calls will become salient and impact upon
termination prices.
  5HJXODWLRQ
In general, to determine the quantitative effects of structural regulatory rules
such as carrier identification or direct mobile charging, we need to resolve the entire
model presented above. However, for carrier identification we can easily determine
the qualitative effects of regulation.
When fixed line consumers can distinguish between the mobile networks they
are calling and have knowledge of any price differentials, the termination charges and
fixed to mobile call prices are the same as the fixed market share case. In this case,
there is no horizontal externality from changing termination charges. Market shares
from subscriber competition still depend on relative termination profits, but
equilibrium will no longer involve choking-off fixed-to-mobile calls.
To see this, suppose that  01
F
BF Ta c c ³- -. No calls will be made from the
fixed network to network B regardless of  AF T  and network B will make no
termination profits. Clearly, network A’s best response is to set  01
F
AF Ta c c <- -. This
will raise both A’s relative and absolute termination profits.￿￿ Thus, A will gain a
bigger subscriber base and make greater total profit. It immediately follows that there
cannot be an equilibrium where both networks set termination charges to choke fixed-
to-mobile demand. Carrier identification will lower the average price of fixed to
mobile calls.￿￿ Note also that mobile subscribers will not face higher fees and may
face lower fees in equilibrium with carrier identification. For example, if there is a

￿￿  The key difference is that under customer ignorance, lowering 
AF T  below the choke price raised A’s absolute
termination profits but lowered its relative termination profits so that total profits fell, not rose.
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symmetric equilibrium both mobile networks will make positive termination profits
and this will be ‘passed back’ to mobile consumers through subscriber competition.
Thus carrier identification benefits both mobile and fixed network customers.
The direct setting of termination charges by a regulator involves a similar
general benefit to customers in our framework. If a regulator sets termination charges
for all mobile carriers below the choke price then in any symmetric equilibrium all
customers gain. This said, it is important to understand that the driving force behind
these gains is the reduction in the horizontal externality that exists between
unregulated mobile networks under customer ignorance. Because of ignorance over
the identity of the terminating mobile network, fixed line customers reduce the
quantity of fixed-to-mobile calls that they buy when one mobile carrier raises its
termination charges, but they do not alter their distribution of calls between mobile
networks. Further, mobile network profit from subscriber competition depends on
relative termination profits as each mobile carrier uses these profits to induce
subscribers to join their network. It pays each mobile carrier to always raise its
relative termination charge because this lowers the other carrier’s termination profits
and raises their own relative termination profits.￿￿ This leads to a race between the
mobile carriers to raise fixed-call termination charges to the choke price. Both carrier
identification and direct regulatory price setting short-circuit this race. Carrier
identification achieves this by eliminating the horizontal externality in termination
profits. Direct regulation, in contrast, simply makes the race illegal.
  )XWXUH'LUHFWLRQV
This paper has analysed the determinants of termination charges for calls to
mobile networks. Because of the number of prices involved and the potential
complexity of strategic interactions we have kept the assumptions relatively minimal
and symmetric. In particular, we have assumed considerable knowledge of consumer
demand, simple horizontal product differentiation, and equivalent mobile network
technologies. Nonetheless, we believe that such assumptions are not restrictive and
relaxing them would not alter our key results.29
That said, there are issues raised by our research that are still unresolved. First,
our results clearly depend on the assumption that mobile networks set a uniform
termination price for fixed line calls. But efficient termination pricing is possible and
can be facilitated by non-linear pricing such as two-part tariffs. While we know that
usage charges in such pricing schemes should reflect marginal costs the issue of fixed
charges is more difficult. Current research suggests that these should be structured to
induce optimal investment incentives.￿￿ However, the analysis here was essentially
static and, as such, not able to address such issues.
Indeed, introducing dynamic analysis into the model would allow other issues
to be addressed. For example, we have assumed that mobile users and fixed line users
are independent. This neglects the important issue of the adoption of mobile services
by consumers and their interaction with consumers who also consume fixed line
services. It also neglects the role for new wireless technologies and their impact on
mobile competition.
Similarly, our model did not consider entry and its effects. In particular, we
did not consider explicitly the role of termination charging in altering the incentives
of entrants. This too remains a fruitful area for future research.
In concluding, it should be noted that our analysis here is not at all specific to
mobile network issues. Indeed, to the extent that consumers have difficulty
distinguishing among competing carriers (a problem exacerbated by the steady
introduction of local number portability), then these considerations would apply to
interactions between many telecommunications networks including fixed line
networks and data communication services. Thus, we expect that the results on
termination presented here would also apply to many other inter-network regulatory
situations in telecommunications.

￿￿ Consequently, so long as termination charges are above their ‘monopoly’ level, lowering those charges will
result in a reduction in mobile subscription charges.
￿￿ See Gans and Williams (1999) and Gans (1999) for a discussion of regulated pricing and investment incentives.30
5HIHUHQFHV
ACCC (1999), “Principles for determining access prices for Domestic GSM
Terminating Access and Domestic GSM Originating Access services,”
Discussion Paper, Melbourne.
Armstrong, M. (1997), “Competition in Telecommunications,” Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, 13 (1), pp.64-81.
Armstrong, M. (1998), “Network Interconnection in Telecommunications,” Economic
Journal, 108 (May), pp.545-564.
Armstrong, M., S. Cowan and J. Vickers (1996), “The Access Pricing Problem: A
Synthesis,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 44 (2), pp.131-150.
Baron, D. (1989), “Design of Regulatory Mechanisms and Institutions,” R.
Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization,
Volume 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp.1347-1447.
Baron, D. and R. Myerson (1982), “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs,”
Econometrica, 50, pp.911-930.
Carter, M. and J. Wright (1999), “Interconnection in Network Industries,” Review of
Industrial Organization, 14 (1), pp.1-25.
Doyle, C. and J.C. Smith (1998), “Market Structure in Mobile Telecoms: Qualified
Indirect Access and the Receiver Pays Principle,” Information Economics and
Policy, 10 (4), pp.471-489.
Gans, J.S. (1998), “Regulating Private Infrastructure Investment: Optimal Pricing of
Access to Essential Facilities,” Working Paper, No.98-13, Melbourne
Business School.
Gans, J.S. and S.P. King (1999), “Regulation of Termination Charges for Non-
Dominant Networks,” Working Paper, No.99-20, Melbourne Business School.
Gans, J.S. and P.L. Williams (1999a), “Access Regulation and the Timing of
Infrastructure Investment,” Economic Record, 79 (229), pp.127-138.
King, S.P. and R. Maddock (1996), Unlocking the Infrastructure, Sydney: Allen &
Unwin.
King, S.P. and R. Maddock (1999), “Light-handed Regulation of Access in Australia:
Negotiation with Arbitration,” Information Economics and Policy, 11 (1),
pp.1-22.
Laffont, J-J., P. Rey and J. Tirole (1998a), “Network Competition I: Overview and
Nondiscriminatory Pricing,” RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (1), pp.1-37.31
Laffont, J-J., P. Rey and J. Tirole (1998b), “Network Competition II: Price
Discrimination,”  RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (1), pp.38-56.
Monopolies and Merger Commission and Oftel (1998), Cellnet and Vodafone,
London.
Perry, M. (1989), “Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects,” R. Schmalensee
and R.D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 1,
Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp.183-258.